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The question why the state ought to punish people who have violated certain kinds of norms 
is one of the oldest concerns of political philosophy. Practices of punishment long preceded 
the evolution of state authority, and even in contemporary liberal societies some punishment 
practices persist (quite legitimately) outside state structures, such as the disciplining of 
children within families. The state’s interest in punishing certain norm violations arose from 
the consolidation of public power, and from the linking of punishment to the overarching task 
and concern of maintaining public peace. Yet the forms and functions of state punishment 
have arguably changed significantly since state punishment first became the norm in the late 
Middle ages.
1
 This is due both to a change in the conception of who we punish, and in our 
understanding of what we may seek to do by way of punishment. In liberal constitutional 
states, we think of state punishment as something that the state does on our behalf to an 
equal, a fellow citizen (used here in the wide sense of someone rightfully present or rightfully 
living in our society), and moreover someone whose rights are not subject to forfeiture by 
reason of what he or she has done.
2
 Both of these developments suggest and support a 
particular conception of state punishment, and more particularly of the sentencing decision: It 
is a decision that should be understood (in this regard, not unlike parental or familial 
punishment) as setting the terms of our continued relations with the perpetrator of a crime in 
light of what he has done.   
This chapter puts forward a conceptualisation of the sentencing judgment appropriate 
for a liberal state:
3
 one that matches the rights-respecting and common weal-oriented 
                                                          
1
 Compare the literature cited in notes 8 and 13 below. For an interesting interpretation of the historical material, 
suggesting that the civilisation of punishment in Europe resulted from an extension to everyone of the respectful 
treatment originally accorded only to high-status prisoners, see J Q Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal 
Punishment and the Widening Divide between America and Europe (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003).  
2
 From an historical perspective, see Whitman ibid. From a philosophical perspective, see R A Duff, ‘A 
Criminal Law for Citizens’ (2010) Theoretical Criminology 293; C Brettschneider, ‘The Rights of the Guilty. 
Punishment and Political Theory’ in (2007) 35 Political Theory 175. 
3
 I use the term ‘liberal’ to denote a political order that is committed to tolerance and to the protection of 
individual rights, but whose conception of the common weal includes a broad role for the state in instantiating 
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foundations of modern state punishment. The criminal law’s justification rests on the 
contribution it makes to upholding the conditions of equal freedom. According equal concern 
and respect at the sentencing stage means that, notwithstanding the commission of the crime, 
severance of relations with the offender is not an option. He remains a member of the polity. 
The task of the sentencing judge is to define how, in our public lives, we move forward from 
here. A punishment that sets the terms of future relationship is inherently reintegrative. This 
conception of state punishment places rehabilitation at the centre of a liberal justification of 
state punishment. Our foundational constitutional commitments also suggest a particular 
understanding of the proportionality of a penal response: a proportionate punishment is one 
that has an inclusionary orientation, seeking to respond to the offender not just qua 
perpetrator of this crime but also as a fellow citizen whose prospects and interests still matter. 
These commitments are sometimes difficult to sustain in the reality of social relations. But a 
state committed to equal freedom has no choice but to uphold them.  
My argument proceeds in three steps. Part I introduces the term-setting conception of 
punishment through a critique of standard definitions of state punishment and the example of 
parental punishment. Acknowledging that it remains an open question whether this re-
integrative perspective on punishment fits punishment as practised though our shared public 
institutions, Part II turns to punishment as practised in the offender-state relationship. Here I 
set out how state punishment forms an integral aspect of the liberal-constitutional project of 
upholding the conditions of equal freedom. By drawing on the writings of Johann Gottlieb 
Fichte, who saw punishment as a ‘way back’ we offer to each other as members of the same 
polity, I defend and develop a reintegrative conception of state punishment. What this means 
for the sentencing decision of the trial court is addressed in Part III of the chapter, where I 
argue that a constitutionally legitimate proportionality assessment must be ‘bifocal’ – focused 
not just on the seriousness of the offending behaviour but also on the question what 
undergoing the punishment will mean for and do to the offender. Humanity and welfare in 
sentencing requires that we, the polity, take responsibility for what we do to a person whom 
we punish. A thicker conception of constitutional proportionality mandates moderate and 
non-destructive punishment. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and maintaining conditions of life conducive to human security and equal freedom. This notion of liberalism 
reflects the self-understanding of the liberal welfare states of modern Europe. In its acceptance of a wide remit 
for legitimate state activity, it is closer to what some writers label ‘republicanism’ than it is to a libertarian 
conception of the state. 
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I. The Term-setting Conception of Punishment 
A. The standard definition  
A fairly standard definition of state punishment would highlight the following features of the 
practice: 1. an intentional infliction of harm or hardship on a person, imposed 2. in order to 
reproach that person for a criminal wrong that the person is found to have committed 3. by 
someone entitled to make this wrong his business and to perform the punishing act.
4
 
This undoubtedly captures central aspects of state punishment. 
First, by classifying the penal sanction as a harm, a form of hard treatment, a setback 
to the punished person’s interests, a deprivation of some of her rights, and so on, the standard 
definition reminds us of what many consider the main issue in the justification of 
punishment: that punishing someone involves doing something to the recipient that is 
typically experienced as unpleasant and that (in a state context) we would otherwise view as a 
violation of her rights. If what is inflicted on the punished person is not recognisably a 
setback to (at least) their liberty-based interests in some appreciable way, then we are not 
dealing with a core case of punishment. 
The standard definition, secondly, reminds us of the way in which punishment is 
necessarily backwards-looking and communicative: It is a response to something the person 
being punished has done, more specifically a response whose point it is (perhaps among 
others) to censure the punished individual for what she has done. What is done is an act of 
reprobation. It signifies that hard treatment is inflicted by reason of the punishee’s having 
behaved badly, and in order to bring it across to her that her earlier behaviour is disapproved 
of.  
Thirdly, the definition makes it clear that the punisher claims for herself a certain kind 
of standing: in the very act of punishing another, the claim is implicit that one is entitled to 
make the offender’s misbehaviour, and hence his punishment, one’s business. Such standing 
arises from the relationship between punisher and punishee. Given that punishment involves 
the actual or potential use of force against the punishee (it is not optional for the individual 
who is being punished to undergo his punishment; he does not undergo it by agreement) this 
                                                          
4
 See e g D Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008) Ch 1; H L A 
Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law, 2nd edn, edited by J Gardner (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2008) 5ff; R A Duff, ‘Legal Punishment’, in E Yalta (ed), Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (revised entry dated 13 May 2013), available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-punishment/.  
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relationship must be asymmetrically structured – in other words, it must be an authority 
relation: the punished person is subject to the authority of the punishing agent in respect of 
the behaviour for which punishment is inflicted.
5
 
 
B. A gap in the standard definition? 
For all its strengths, the standard definition misses a pivotal feature of punishment. To see 
this, it helps to take a step back from state punishment and to enter another very familiar 
penal setting: parental punishment.  
Why do parents sometimes punish their children? What I have in mind here are not 
trivial occasions where children disobey their parents and suffer mild consequences (such as 
being deprived of ice cream after failing to heed the parental warning that ‘If you don’t put 
that smartphone aside now, you will not get any ice cream for dessert’), but instances of fairly 
serious misbehaviour – say, when a teenager is found to have taken a not insignificant sum of 
money from his mother’s purse to buy himself a desired item that she refused to buy for him. 
The mother then faces the uncomfortable realisation that she cannot just let this sort of 
behaviour go, even though she might feel tempted to do just that. Moreover, she realises that 
her response must have the features identified by the standard definition of punishment. 
Why? Because her response will set the terms for her continued future existence with her son, 
and these terms must be set so as to make it clear to him that this sort of behaviour by him 
will not be tolerated. Let’s imagine that the mother decides that her son will be ‘grounded’ 
for four consecutive weekends and that he also has to do household chores such as cleaning 
the bathroom and the kitchen for her until the value of his cleaning work equals the sum of 
money he has taken. It will undoubtedly take some effort from her to see this through. What 
will motivate her to make that effort is the knowledge that she and her son will have to 
continue to live together and that they cannot do so on terms where he gets away with 
stealing her money. She needs to establish a durable and satisfactory basis for their future 
interactions.     
The important feature which the parental punishment scenario shares with state 
punishment, and which the standard definition of punishment merely alludes to by 
                                                          
5
 But see L Zaibert, Punishment and Retribution (Aldershot, Ashgate 2006) for a sustained challenge to 
definitions of punishment that build (state) authority into the definition. Thom Brooks, in his review of Zaibert’s 
book, perceptively points out that on Zaibert’s definition, the conceptual distinction between punishment and 
revenge may be lost, and it becomes more difficult to develop the grounds for normatively distinguishing 
between legitimate and illegitimate punishment ((2007) 10 New Criminal Law Review 311 at 313–14). 
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highlighting the reprobative element, is this: Typically, we engage in punishing a person 
because we assume that a ‘life in common’6 will somehow have to continue with that person. 
There is little point in going to the trouble of punishing someone if we will never see them 
again (though we can, of course, quickly do something to them to ‘get even’ before they 
disappear from our lives). Punishment is integral to social practices that teach individuals 
how to live together.
7
  
As a general social practice, then, punishment does not merely mark out the 
punishee’s actions as wrong and blames him for engaging in this wrongful act. It also defines 
how both punishee and punisher will move forward from here. The penal agent lays down the 
terms of his or her future co-existence with the offender in a shared social world. Because 
this is punishment’s central social function, there is a re-integrative momentum inherent in 
punishment that gives the offender himself an interest in being punished. Far from 
threatening or challenging an offender’s membership in the community, punishment reasserts 
and reinforces it. 
C. Punishment and Exclusion 
But isn’t there an obvious challenge to this conceptualisation of the point of our penal 
practices? Doesn’t punishment sometimes consist in the severance of relationship? Isn’t 
permanent exclusion on the cards as something like ‘the ultimate sanction’, whether in 
informal, interpersonal or in public and state-administered penal interactions?  
Historically it is of course undeniable that some of the things that were done to people 
by way of sanctioning them for past misbehaviour amounted to their permanent exclusion 
from their communities.
8
 One of the sharpest punishments practised by Germanic tribes was 
                                                          
6
 This is the expression used by Timothy Macklem for a shared communal life governed by norms; see T 
Macklem, Law and Life in Common (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2015). 
7
 M K Stohr, A Walsh and C Hemmens, Corrections: A Text/Reader (Thousand Oaks, Sage, 2009) 3 summarise 
the findings of evolutionary biologists as establishing that ‘[p]unishment (referred to as moralistic or retaliatory 
aggression) … is an evolutionary stable strategy … for the emergence and maintenance of cooperative behavior’ 
(original emphases omitted). Psychologists have developed more nuanced accounts of the functions of 
punishment and reward in education. See generally A Bandura and R H Walters, Social Learning and 
Personality Development (New York, Holt, Rinhart and Winston, 1963). The ‘moral education’ theory of 
punishment developed by J Hampton (‘The Moral Education Theory of Punishment’ (1984) 13 Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 208), by contrast, relies on a normative account of moral education and does not build on 
sociobiological understandings of punishment.  
8
 Sanctions aimed at expelling individuals from communities coexisted with a raft of sanctions that were 
practised on those expected to remain – mostly, sanctions involving public humiliation, shaming and exposure. 
For the historical development, see C L von Bar, A History of Continental Criminal Law, translated by T S Bell 
and others (London, John Murray, 1916) Chs 2 and 4; E Schmidt, Einführung in die Geschichte der deutschen 
Strafrechtspflege 3rd edn (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965). 
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to declare the miscreant vogelfrei, literally ‘free as a bird’ – effectively an outlaw. This 
declaration rendered him rightless. He mattered no more than a wild animal to which anyone 
could do what they liked.
9
 In later ages, transportation arguably amounted to something 
similar to permanent exclusion even though it was often technically imposed for a limited 
time period, the transported criminal being in theory free after its expiration to return to his 
home land.
10
 And insofar as the death penalty is still practised its point also appears to be to 
destroy any possibility of a future life in common – not even the life in common that exists 
between free members of the polity and those incarcerated in prisons or otherwise 
institutionalised.
11
  
These observations may lead us to doubt that, conceptually, punishment is necessarily 
a re-integrative institution. The communicative dimension of penal practice reminds us that 
someone may inflict a response by way of punishment that in effect consists in expelling the 
individual from the community. While such penal dispositions are unlikely to be (at least in 
practice) a frequent penal response, they are arguably still recognisably cases of 
punishment.
12
  
A long line of legal historians have, however, defended the view that the difference 
between expulsion and non-expulsion provides us with the conceptual boundary of 
punishment, and in developing this point their argument invariably turns on the authority 
relation that genuine punishment appears to require. Some have stressed that being expelled 
from a community means that one is no longer under the authority (and, of course, the 
protection) of the law that governs this community, and that those outside our legal sphere of 
concern are not fit subjects for the exercise of legal authority over them (since they are not 
legal subjects) – whereas punishment is centrally the exercise of lawful authority.13 At least 
                                                          
9
 On outlawry, see von Bar ibid at 62–66 and Schmidt ibid. 
10
 On transportation, see J M Beattie, Crime and the Courts in England, 1660–1800 (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1986) Ch 9; S Devereaux, ‘In Place of Death: Transportation, Penal Practices, and the English State, 
1770–1830’, in C Strange (ed), Qualities of Mercy: Justice, Punishment and Discretion (Vancouver, UBC 
Press, 1996) Ch 2; C Herrup, ‘Punishing Pardon: Some Thoughts on the Origins of Penal Transportation’, in S 
Devereaux and P Griffiths (eds), Penal Practice and Culture, 1500-1900 : Punishing the English (Basingstoke, 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 121.  
11
 Even before the humanisation of imprisonment, brought about, inter alia, through prisoner rights litigation, the 
nature of imprisonment as a regime under which legal relations are continued rather than severed cannot be in 
doubt. On contemporary relations of imprisonment, see D Van Zyl Smit and S Snacken, Principles of European 
Prison Law and Policy: Penology and Human Rights (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009). On the history 
of imprisonment, see T Krause, Geschichte des Strafvollzugs. Von den Kerkern des Altertums bis zur Gegenwart  
(Darmstadt, Primus, 1999).  
12
 At least where the motivation behind their infliction is retributive rather than preventive. 
13
 See already von Bar, History, above n 8 at 57–66, 71–76, 95ff. For modern analyses, see H Nehlsen, 
‘Entstehung des öffentlichen Strafrechts bei den germanischen Stämmen‘, in K Kroeschell (ed), Gerichtslauben-
Vorträge. Freiburger Festkolloquium zum fünfundsiebzigsten Geburtstag von Hans Thieme (Sigmaringen, Jan 
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in Western Europe, punishment developed as a practice by which one deals with those under 
one’s government – and was thus not how criminal wrongs were dealt with among free men 
(suggesting that outlawry marked the end of peaceful relations between equals rather than an 
authoritative exercise of penal power within a hierarchical relationship).
14
  
One indication that relationship-severing reactions may indeed mark the conceptual 
boundary of punishment can be found in the exact message that relationship-severing 
dispositions send. Arguably, their communicative meaning is not exhausted in the simple 
message that ‘this is what I do to you in response to your crime’. It is, more specifically, that: 
‘Because of your crime, I wash my hands off you. I will have nothing to do with you any 
more. I will make no effort on your behalf. The world in which I live no longer includes you.’ 
Relationship-severing reactions thus come across not as punishments but rather as reactions 
to transgressions we are no longer prepared to punish.
15
 They signify a refusal to affirm the 
continuation of the relationship by punishing. Recall that punishing a person may require 
considerable commitment and continuing effort on the part of the punisher, an investment of 
sorts, something that the punisher must consider worth her while. From the punisher’s 
perspective the effort is worthwhile because it will (in her expectation) re-establish the terms 
of their communal existence.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Torbecke, 1983) 3. On the evolution of a public criminal law generally, see D Willoweit (ed), Die Entstehung 
des öffentlichen Strafrechts. Bestandsaufnahme eines europäischen Forschungsproblems (Cologne, Böhlau, 
1999); H Schlosser, R Sprandel und D Willoweit (eds), Herrschaftliches Strafen seit dem Hochmittelalter. 
Formen und Entwicklungsstufen (Cologne, Böhlau, 2002); K Lüderssen (ed), Die Durchsetzung des öffentlichen 
Strafanspruchs. Systematisierung der Fragestellung (Cologne, Böhlau, 2002); and J Weitzel (ed), Hoheitliches 
Strafen in der Spätantike und im frühen Mittelalter (Cologne, Böhlau, 2002). 
14
 German legal historians have convincingly suggested that outlawry was distinct from state punishment, since 
outlawry, as Mireille Hildebrandt explains, was practiced between freemen and ‘placed [the offender] outside 
the community of freemen and outside the grasp of its peace’ (M Hildebrandt, ‘Radbruch on the Origins of the 
Criminal Law’, in M D Dubber (ed), Foundational Texts in Modern Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2014) 219 at 232). State punishment, by contrast, emerged from the essentially hierarchical and unequal 
relationship between serfs and their overlords; see G Radbruch, ‘Der Ursprung des Strafrechts aus dem Stande 
der Unfreien’, in G Radbruch, Elegantiae Juris Criminalis: Vierzehn Studien zur Geschichte des Strafrechts 
(Basel, Verlag für Recht und Gesellschaft, 1950) 11, of which Hildebrandt’s essay is a fascinating discussion 
and evaluation. A translation of Radbruch’s essay is available at http://www.oup.com/uk/law/foundational-texts. 
15
 Hannah Arendt famously suggested that there are crimes of such enormity that we reach a limit to our ability 
to respond to them meaningfully by way of punishment. She then went on to suggest that, for this reason, we 
would also reach a conceptual barrier to forgiveness (H Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd edn with an 
introduction by Margaret Canovan (Chicago and London, University of Chicago Press, 1998) 241). While, with 
Pumla Gobodo-Madikizela, I doubt that our ability to forgive is conceptually tied to our ability to punish, the 
question how we should respond to persons who have committed crimes that we feel we simply cannot respond 
to through a mechanism that offers them a way back, remains both acute and unsolved. For an incisive reflection 
on Arendt’s position, see P Gobodo-Madikizela, ‘Radical Forgiveness: Transforming Traumatic Memory 
beyond Hannah Arendt’ in F du Bois and A du Bois-Pedain (eds), Justice and Reconciliation in Post-Apartheid 
South Africa (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008) 37. 
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The pressing question, then, is whether the term-setting conception of punishment 
introduced in this section through the analogy of parental punishment provides us with a 
viable perspective on state punishment. Parental punishment is, after all, quite different from 
state punishment in that it is (ideally at least) a constructive form of discipline linked to a 
child’s upbringing through parental guidance within the family. That said, as Thorburn 
rightly stresses in his contribution to this collection, something that parental and state 
punishment have in common is the relationship of authority from which the penal standing of 
the punishing agent flows. We must therefore look at the nature of the relationship between 
members of a polity and its public authority to see whether the term-setting conception of 
punishment is also applicable to the sentencing judgment of a criminal court. The next Part of 
this chapter analyses this relationship, arguing that the humanistic and political commitments 
on which life in a liberal political community is based require a re-integrative conception of 
punishment that rules out the severance of relationship as a response to crimes. 
II. Punishment and the Offender-State Relationship 
A. State punishment and the conditions of equal freedom 
What is distinctive about modern constitutional states is a certain conception of the rights of 
members of the populace. Most importantly in the present context, they consist in our 
guaranteeing to each other the most extensive personal freedom that is compatible with equal 
freedom exercised by others, and to do so through public institutions that provide equal 
protection to the (normatively conceived) interests of all. Even if there were no philosophical 
knock-down argument as to why people have certain fundamental rights, and why these 
rights (including the right to membership in the polity) should be inalienable, there would be 
ample grounds for saying that a political order based on the recognition of such rights is 
preferable to one which is not so structured. This is because an order committed to the 
recognition and protection of such rights fosters actual security (it does not do to people what 
would be destructive of their most important interests) as well as perceptions of security 
(people expect that the actions of those who hold positions of power will not be destructive of 
their interests).
16
 It is therefore an order in which the answer that can be given to members 
                                                          
16
 See also Zedner’s chapter in this volume. 
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who make what Bernard Williams memorably calls the ‘basic legitimation demand’17 is 
likely to be a satisfactory one: ‘I exert power over you (among others) because my doing so is 
in your interest’.18 
When we think of the criminal law as helping to instantiate and preserve the 
conditions of equal freedom, we will first focus our minds on how to preserve freedom at the 
legislative stage. This will give us some guidance as to what behaviours we need to address 
through criminalisation. But already at this stage we need to be sensitive to the question how 
an ‘order of freedom’19 would address those whose freedom is to be secured – as moral 
agents, not as tigers to be controlled.
20
 And – at least to some extent – we will also think 
about the question how our enforcement mechanisms should, concretely, interact with those 
we suspect of having violated this order of freedom, and then how they should respond to 
those who are found to have violated it. But these matters remain rather abstract at the 
legislative or (from an enforcement perspective) ex ante stage of the criminal law. At this 
stage, criminal law does the job it is meant to do if it only criminalises behaviour that can be 
legitimately criminalised as being inimical to the preservation of an order of freedom, and (to 
the extent that this order is preserved by addressing us as potential law-breakers) by offering 
us – in form of threats of punishment – an additional prudential disincentive to desist from 
criminal law-violations. As Andreas von Hirsch has correctly highlighted, this means that not 
just any punishment can be threatened by the law. The punishment must be measured, 
                                                          
17
 See B Williams, In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in Political Argument, edited by G 
Hawthorn (Princeton NJ, Princeton University Press, 2005) 5. The notion of the ‘basic legitimation demand’ is 
interpreted and explored by Bottoms and Tankebe, who explain it as the ‘demand by subjects that the power-
holder should provide adequate justification of his/her claim to rule’ (Bottoms and Tankebe, in this volume). I 
am grateful to them for drawing my attention to Williams’ essay. 
18
 This possible answer to the demand remains fairly abstract. What meeting the basic legitimation demand 
entails concretely in the interactions between representatives of state authority and members of the public, is the 
focus of Bottoms’ and Tankebe’s chapter in this collection.  
19
 Note that by speaking of an ‘order of freedom’ or ‘the conditions of equal freedom’, I do not mean to nail my 
flag to the mast of any particular political theory of what the preservation of freedom entails, and conversely 
rules out. Rather I use this phrase here as a placeholder for a convincing account. Personally, I lean towards a 
Hegelian-inspired (sometimes called republican) understanding that conceives of freedom ‘not so much [as] a 
matter of being left alone as it is “the condition of citizenship in a free society”’ (R Dagger, ‘Republicanism and 
Crime’, in S Besson and J L Martí (eds), Legal Republicanism: National and International Perspectives 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2009) 147 at 154 (quoting J Braithwaite and P Pettit, Not Just Deserts: A 
Republican Theory of Punishment (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1990) 57)). For a sustained Hegelian account of 
what makes a free society, see A Honneth, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life 
(Cambridge, Polity Press, 2014). 
20
 See A von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1993) 13–14. 
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otherwise it risks drowning out the moral message that is respectful of a legal subject’s moral 
agency and personality even when it is telling the subject what not to do.
21
 
Respect for offenders as moral agents matters again – and in a somewhat different 
way from what we have already set out above – when the criminal law stands to be applied to 
a particular person in respect of a particular incident. Viewed simply from an ex ante 
perspective, the criminal law might well restrict itself to conduct rules pure and simple. 
Effective conduct guidance needs to presuppose, and would therefore import, a certain extent 
of mens rea considerations – enough to differentiate between agency and non-agency, but no 
more.
22
 Yet it is generally not doubted that the criminal law should contain rules of 
evaluation that address a law-breaker’s culpability in a more comprehensive sense.23 The 
constitutional reason for wanting blameworthiness and exculpatory defences to matter at the 
adjudication stage is that relating to each other as moral agents (as opposed to something like 
harm-causing automatons) requires us to be responsive to the reasoning processes and the 
motives of the other person – to her culpability, above and beyond the kinds of mental states 
that made her conduct a token of the exercise of her agential powers in the world.
24
 ‘All that 
matters to me is that you did it; your beliefs, attitudes and motives at the time and the 
pressures which may have been exerted upon you are irrelevant to me’ would be tantamount 
                                                          
21
 Ibid. For an interesting challenge to the empirical plausibility of the drowning-out objection to harsh 
penalties, see M Matravers, ‘Is Twenty-first Century Punishment Post-desert?’, in M Tonry (ed), Retributivism 
has a Past. Has it a Future?  (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 30 at 38–39. For a defence of the 
‘prudential disincentive’ perspective on legal sanctions, see Z Hoskins, ‘Deterrent Punishment and Respect for 
Persons’ (2011) 8 Ohio State Journal of Criminal Law 369 at 382–84. 
22
 For discussion of this point, see Mark Dsouza, A Theory of Rationale-based Defences (PhD thesis, University 
of Cambridge, 2014) Ch 2, drawing on Meir Dan-Cohen’s well-known article ‘Decision Rules and Conduct 
Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law’ (1983–1984) 97 Harvard Law Review 625, where Dan-Cohen 
distinguishes between conduct rules (addressed to the citizen) and rules of adjudication (addressed to officials). 
When applied to the criminal law, rules of adjudication are not (as one might otherwise think) only procedural 
rules. Rather, they include what one might perhaps label ‘rules of evaluation’ – certain provisions and concepts 
of the substantive criminal law that tell adjudicators how to evaluate a breach of the criminal law rather than 
telling a member of the polity prescriptively how to avoid committing a crime. Broadly speaking, substantive 
rules that go towards the blameworthiness of defendants (giving rise to incapacity or to non-justificatory 
exculpation) belong to this group.  
23
 On these two senses of culpability, see J Dressler, Understanding Criminal Law 6th edn (Albany NY, 
LexisNexis, 2012) 118–19.  For the reasons given in the text, culpability in this wider sense is relevant not just 
for those who (to paraphrase Douglas Husak) ‘dream the retributivist dream’; a point that is overlooked by D 
Lefkowitz, ‘Blame and the Criminal Law’ (2015) 6 Jurisprudence 451 in his otherwise very interesting rebuttal 
of D Shoemaker, ‘Blame and Punishment’ in D J Coats and N A Tognazzini (eds), Blame: Its Nature and 
Norms (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013) 100. 
24
 On the culpability principle and its roots in a commitment to engaging with offenders as moral agents, see T 
Hörnle and M D Dubber,  Criminal Law: A Comparative Approach (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2014) 
108–9 (quoting a decision by the German Federal Supreme Court, BGHSt2, 194 (200)). For an historical 
analysis, see S Stübinger, Schuld, Strafrecht und Geschichte. Die Entstehung der Schuldzurechnung in der 
deutschen Strafrechtshistorie (Cologne, Böhlau, 2000). 
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to saying ‘I refuse to see you and relate to you as a moral agent, I see you and relate to you 
merely as a cause of harm’. This is a stance we reject in our political constitution.  
At the sentencing stage we yet again need to ask the question what our fundamental 
political commitments mean for how we should go about things at this point. The generalised 
ex-ante aim of all good governance, to provide a system of rules conducive to human 
freedom and security, to a well-lived life in common, does not as such provide us with direct 
guidance as to how state authority should act in the particular, ex-post case of responding to a 
situation where its ex-ante prohibition has failed to prevail. One of the first philosophers to 
see this clearly was Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and although his answer is given in the context of 
a social contract theory that has not attracted many followers, it pays to look at how he sets 
up and resolves the problem of justifying the infliction of punishment in concrete cases.
25
   
Fichte thinks that what obligates people towards each other is a social contract under 
whose terms they recognise each other as holders of rights. The commission of a crime 
signifies, for Fichte, that the contract is breached, in consequence of which the contract is 
terminated and all rights that the offender had under the contract are lost.
26
 This, however, is 
not the end of the matter, nor is punishment yet anywhere in sight. Building the familiar 
historical notion of outlawry into his theory, Fichte at this point assumes that the crime 
pushes relations between the offender and the polity into a state of rightlessness – as our brief 
discussion in Part I intimated, a perilous situation for the offender since he is no longer 
connected to others through relations of right and anything might be done to him with 
impunity.
27
  
The interesting step in Fichte’s account follows on this. Most of the time, he points 
out, it is neither in our communal interest nor in the interest of the offender himself that he 
remains in a condition where no rights are recognised between him and us. Therefore, instead 
of now simply treating the offender as an outlaw, the state will usually offer him a way back 
                                                          
25
 Fichte’s discussion of state punishment can be found in § 20 of his Grundlage des Naturrechts nach 
Principien der Wissenschaftslehre  Vol 2 (Jena and Leipzig, Gabler, 1797).  I quote here from the English 
translation: J G Fichte, Foundations of Natural Right According to the Principles of the Wissenschaftslehre, 
edited by F Neuhouser and translated by M Baur (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) 226–48. 
Fichte’s theory of punishment receives a brief but excellent treatment in von Bar, History, above n 8 at 424ff. 
Valuable recent discussions include A Lazzari, ‘“Eine Fessel, die nicht schmerzt und nicht sehr hindert”: 
Strafrecht (§ 20)’, in J C Merle (ed), Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Grundlage des Naturrechts (Berlin, Akademie-
Verlag, 2001) 173 and R Zaczyk, Das Strafrecht in der Rechtslehre J G Fichtes (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 
1981).  
26
 Fichte ibid at 226.     
27
 See esp. Fichte ibid at 241–42. Whatever we may do to a former member of our polity who, through his 
crime, has forfeited his rights, is not punishment. 
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– and this way back is through punishment.28 State punishment is thus conceived of in terms 
of an Abbüßungsvertrag
29
 (contract of atonement), from which (as von Bar explains Fichte’s 
argument) ‘the criminal derives “the important right” that he is not declared absolutely 
without rights but is to be punished’.30 Fichte effectively treats the criminal law itself as a 
general-anticipatory contract of atonement – in the punishments it threatens (with the 
immediate purpose of preventing violations of the law), it also anticipates the terms on which 
a future contract of atonement will be struck.
31
  
Fichte’s starting point that an offender loses all his rights through the commission of 
the crime and has to be allowed back and regain his rights through a ‘contract of atonement’ 
is not one that we need to accept – in fact, we have to resist it because our foundational 
political commitment is to accord each other rights that are inalienable, including the right to 
membership. But the difference this makes is unimportant in the context of the present 
discussion. What matters here is Fichte’s realisation that the purpose we pursue ex ante with a 
penal prohibition that threatens punishment (to protect our rights as persons living under a 
social contract) does not carry across to the imposition of punishment. At this point, the 
deterrent threat of punishment has failed in the individual case, the prudential appeal has not 
been heeded. If we identify the function of the criminal law at the ex ante stage with (broadly 
speaking) rights-protection and preventive regulation, then the imposition of punishment does 
(and must necessarily) serve a different function. 
B. The reintegrative orientation of state punishment 
What, then, is the function of the imposition of punishment?  
[A]ll citizens promise to all others that they will give them the opportunity to make 
themselves fit to live in society once again, if in the present they are found to be unfit; 
                                                          
28
 Fichte ibid at 227 and 236.  
29
 Fichte’s own exposition is more complicated, in that he presupposes not one but two contracts of atonement. 
The first one deals only with offences for which ‘expiation by adequate counterpoise’ is possible (ibid, 227–29). 
This contract does not cover any crimes arising from an offender’s ‘formally bad’ will, nor crimes committed 
directly against the state (236). A second contract of atonement (discussed at 236–40) deals with this much 
larger group of offences – and this is the contract of atonement to which my discussion in the text relates.  
30
 Von Bar, History, above n 8 at 425 (quoting Fichte). Incidentally, it follows from Fichte’s position that the 
death penalty is not a punishment at all, and must be understood rather as something we do to a person who we 
no longer treat as having any rights and to whom we refuse to offer a contract of atonement. See von Bar ibid. 
31
 Note that this right is not absolute, but premised on the ability of the offender to give sufficient assurance  that 
he can ‘make [himself] fit to live in society again’ – which, Fichte assumes, those guilty of ‘intentional, 
premeditated murder’ will be unable to do (Fichte, Natural Right, above n 25 at 241). 
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and (what is also entailed by this contract) that they will accept them back into 
society, after they have reformed,
32
 
is how Fichte explains the terms of the contract of atonement. Punishment thus aims at the 
‘political reformation’ of the offender, which Fichte defined as ‘reform of the manners and 
maxims of a person’s actual behaviour’ and ‘certainly not the moral reform of one’s inner 
disposition’.33 Fichte insists that the time an offender spends in an institution of rehabilitation 
(which is Fichte’s conception of the prison) must be subject to a ‘peremptory term for reform, 
in accordance with his particular crime’.34 The overall orientation of punishment towards 
reformation does not however permit us to set open-ended terms of indefinite punishment, 
with successful reformation of an offender a condition of his release. Reasonable contractual 
terms can include the promise that part of the punishment will be waived if things go well. 
But they cannot consist in saying ‘you are going to be punished until at a later time I decide 
otherwise’. 
Fichte’s central insight into the nature of state punishment as concerned with an 
offender’s reintegration into the community of the law-abiding, on terms that are (in my 
reading of Fichte’s theory) set within the broad framework provided for by the criminal law 
and legitimated in the individual case by the offender’s ability to provide us with sufficient 
reassurance of his future law-abidingness, helps us to address the classical freedom-oriented 
challenge against reformatory punishment: the suggestion that state punishment may not aim 
to ‘better’ or ‘improve’ the criminal.35 This challenge is based on a certain conception of 
what respecting freedom means. We should not interfere with people’s lives through the 
criminal law if all we aim to do is paternalistically to interfere with the way they conduct 
their lives. Legitimate interference must be directed at conduct that properly concerns other 
members of the polity because it is conduct that oversteps the boundaries of equal freedom – 
centrally, because it is harmful to others and violates or endangers their rights, or significant 
communal interests (say, the preservation of the environment, or road safety).  
                                                          
32
 Fichte ibid at 236. 
33
 Fichte ibid at 237 (emphasis original). 
34
 Fichte ibid at 240. Note, however, that for Fichte this ‘peremptory term’ for reform also functions as a 
deadline – the offender will be released, indeed, but if unreformed he will be denied re-entry into society and 
will be excluded from the polity after all. For discussion see Zaczyk, Strafrecht, above n 25 at 115ff. 
35
 See, generally, M Matravers, ‘Political Neutrality and Punishment’ (2013) 7 Criminal Law and Philosophy, 
217 at 219, discussing ‘possible tensions … between  (impartialist) liberalism and aspects of a system of 
criminal law and punishment’, arising in particular when state penal policies are based on rejecting some 
conceptions of the good, or on promoting others.  Even if punishment does not aim to reform morally but only 
politically (in Fichte’s sense), it clearly aims to inculcate in the offender skills and a work ethic conducive to a 
different way of life.  
 14 
 
But this argument has force mainly at the criminalisation stage. Assuming a properly 
restrained reach of the criminal law, it is the violation of the conditions of equal freedom that 
authorises the penal response by the state. What makes this response legitimate, however, is 
not (again) that it does not set itself a paternalistic objective. Quite the contrary: what 
legitimates punishment is that the offender is prepared for living in the conditions of equal 
freedom. A state that respects the basic entitlement of all members of its population to the 
conditions of equal freedom has a duty to help those of its inhabitants who cannot respect 
these conditions to acquire the capacity to do so.
36
 And – as Fichte himself clearly sees – 
offenders cannot be prepared for a responsible life in freedom through an experience of 
animal-like captivity in which their ability to lead a self-directed life is dulled instead of 
furthered.
37
 He calls for regimes of imprisonment that further responsible agency by allowing 
prisoners significant self-governance in prison.
38
 Prison life should thus inculcate the values, 
dispositions and habits essential for a law-abiding life post-release.
39
  
As for the appropriate level of penal severity, Fichte has this to say: 
The primary rule in this regard is that one should neither despair of [the prisoners’] 
reform, nor cause them to despair of it – and furthermore, that they should have some 
degree of satisfaction with their condition, as well as the hope to improve it.
40
 
This view does not commit us to purely reform-oriented punishment across the board. To see 
this, consider how the duties we have towards young offenders (and the consequent offender-
orientation) in the context of youth justice differ from the recognition of an adult offender’s 
non-forfeitable status of equal political membership. As individual human beings, many adult 
offenders may well be rather similar to young offenders when it comes to social and 
individual dysfunctionalities that are generative of criminal behaviour. They may have low 
levels of skills, bad anger control and generally underdeveloped abilities at self-management. 
                                                          
36
 Compare E N Yankah, ‘Republican Responsibility in Criminal Law’ (2015) 9 Criminal Law and Philosophy 
457. 
37
 Fichte, Natural Right, above n 25 at 240.  
38
 Fichte ibid at 239. 
39
 A politically reformed offender is one whose ‘dissoluteness has been replaced by a love of diligence and 
order, [his] savagery replaced by a milder sensibility’ (Fichte ibid at 240). What Fichte means by this concretely 
becomes clear from his sketch of reformatory practice discussed in the text: offenders should acquire the skills 
and habits that give them a stake, and reasonable prospects of self-maintenance, in mainstream society. 
40
 Fichte ibid at 238. One should, however, avoid the impression that Fichte offers on this topic what we would 
nowadays regard as a coherent and fully worked out liberal position. Fichte’s own exposition is somewhat 
meandering and on occasion veers wildly between what modern readers would consider calls to unreasonable 
harshness and moderate suggestions. Moreover, the steps in the argument are often open to question. Fichte’s 
own vision of constructive prison life (in something akin to an island community of prisoners) betrays a certain 
degree of disconnection from common sense.  
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They may also struggle with addiction and with mental illness. There is certainly a line of 
continuity here (which is also unsurprising, given that many young offenders continue 
offending into (at least) early adulthood).
41
 Yet the objectives of sentencing – also the 
communicative objectives – change when we move from youth to adult cases. They change 
with the community’s overall relationship with the offender. What we owe (as a community) 
to under-age members (whether they have come in conflict with the law or not) is in two 
important ways defined by that person’s status as being under-age: This supplies both a 
ground and justification for paternalistic intervention, and an obligation to educate and 
protect.
42
 And it is accepted that doing these things in the interest of young people imposes 
certain additional burdens on other members of the community – and that it is distributively 
appropriate that they should be shouldered by the community. It is a shared obligation to help 
young people get a sufficiently good start in communal life – and to the extent that the young 
person is failing at that, part of the responsibility for making things right rebounds on those 
who are generally responsible for helping the young get a reasonable start. It is thus our duty 
towards the young offender that mandates the educational or reform-orientation of youth 
justice.  
The sense that we have obligations towards offenders does not evaporate when 
offenders reach adulthood. But the nature and extent of the obligations change. The 
sentencing judgment speaks to the offender, the victim and the community, and what it 
communicates are the terms that we – a political community that governs itself under the 
ideal of equal freedom – believe are appropriate to impose on a member of our polity who 
has violated the terms of equal freedom. We believe that some hardship is necessary to mark 
the seriousness of what he has done. Proportionate punishment is therefore the first and 
foremost objective – it is the way in which we mark the seriousness of the offending conduct 
(and treat each other as equals in doing so). But we also believe that the offence is not the end 
                                                          
41
 See generally A A J Blokland and P Nieuwbeerta, ‘Life Course Criminology’, in S G Shoham, P Knepper and 
M Kett (eds), International Handbook of Criminology (Boca Raton, CRC Press, 2010) 51; M Rocque and B C 
Welsh, ‘Offender Rehabilitation from a Maturation/Biosocial Perspective’, in M DeLisi and M G Vaughn (eds), 
Routledge International Handbook of Biosocial Criminology (Abingdon, Routledge, 2015) 501. 
42
 Compare e g the German Juvenile Justice Act, s 2 (Aims of the Juvenile Justice System): ‘(1) The main aim 
of the application of criminal law to young people is to counter renewed offending by young persons. In order to 
achieve this goal, procedure and disposals … shall be chosen primarily with educational objectives in mind.’ 
See also Sentencing Guidelines Council, Overarching Principles: Sentencing Youths: Definitive Guideline 
(November 2009), para. 1.2: ‘When sentencing an offender aged under 18, a court must have regard to: a) the 
principal aim of the youth justice system (to prevent offending by children and young persons); and b) the 
welfare of the offender.’ See also (with individual contributions analysing juvenile justice policies and policy 
shifts in various jurisdictions) J Junger-Tas and S H Decker (eds), International Handbook of Juvenile Justice 
(New York, Springer, 2006). 
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of relations between us and the offender. Punishment does not sever legal or societal links. 
The offender is here to stay, and he or she is (at least in principle) also here one day to return 
to a life in freedom. For that reason, proportionate punishment must also be constructive – 
constructive in the sense that a successful life in freedom must be a real possibility. We must 
not (as Ashworth once put it) ‘de-socialise’ the offender,43 and we may have to (as Yankah 
argued) provide active assistance to those who once released would otherwise not stand much 
of a chance of building law-abiding lives for themselves.
44
  
The sentencing decision marks the moment where the criminal law moves from 
threatening people with certain consequences for breaches of its rules to doing burdensome 
things to particular individuals who have transgressed these rules anyway. When this stage is 
reached, the conceptually dominant goal becomes rehabilitation.  
To see why this is so, we need to recall what justifies the state in actually punishing 
an offender: the offender’s interest in partaking again in a life in common committed to the 
preservation of the conditions of equal freedom. His interest in succeeding in such 
participation – in leading a coercion-free life in the future – provides the justification for a 
penal imposition that has his reformation as its goal (and realistically possible outcome). 
Based on our discussion thus far, more can be said about how this goal may be 
pursued. Punishments aimed at an offender’s personal reform run the risk of overstepping  
the ‘license’ given to the state, which is only to preserve conditions of equal freedom, not to 
make people better people as such.
45
 To place rehabilitation within the license, we have to 
connect it to the understanding of the sanction as setting out the terms for future existence in 
a shared social world – conditions bounded by the focus on securing the conditions of equal 
freedom for all. Rehabilitation is a legitimate goal of the criminal justice system when it is 
based on acknowledging that it serves the interests of offenders as well, in that it is meant to 
make it more likely that they will be able to conduct themselves in future as members of 
society who respect the conditions of equal freedom for all.  
The most important aspect of the trial court’s sentencing judgment is that, in 
determining what should happen to an offender in respect of the crime, the judgment holds 
                                                          
43
 A Ashworth, ‘European Sentencing Traditions: Accepting Divergence or Aiming for Convergence?’, in C 
Tata and N Hutton, Sentencing and Society: International Perspectives (Aldershot, Ashgate 2002).  
44
 E N Yankah, ‘Republican Responsibility’, above n 36 at 473.  This is why it is entirely right that liberal 
constitutions such as the Italian one mandate that the objective of punishment is rehabilitative, and link this to 
the state’s respect for the dignity of offenders. 
45
 Compare also A von Hirsch and A Ashworth, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 2005) Ch 7 (critiquing the penance perspective developed by Antony Duff). 
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out the promise that this is what will settle the matter; it defines how we move forward from 
here. The sentence is part of an interaction that is irreducibly not merely past- but also future-
oriented: future-oriented in the sense that it is aimed at creating the conditions under which 
full equality and full community with the perpetrator is re-established. This conception of the 
sentencing judgment is the only one appropriate to the criminal justice practices of a 
constitutional state. In such a state, exclusion is not an option; rights are not forfeitable – they 
cannot be lost or denied as a consequence of a crime; they can merely be limited or interfered 
with in certain ways. Legitimate state punishment punishes offenders on the assumption that 
a way of life that includes both the punisher and the punishee continues for the duration of 
and also after the punishment – the assumption is one of a shared social world, in which 
punisher and punishee both remain. If we break the law, terms of atonement must always be 
offered to us. 
III. Choosing the Sentence: How to Punish Proportionately 
A. Proportionality and individualisation 
If one treats the perspective on the sentencing judgment put forward here as ‘the basis of a 
sentencing system’,46 then certain parameters emerge as necessary or desirable features of the 
system. Some leeway to individualise sentences is constitutionally required because the 
legitimacy of the individual sentence hinges on the defensibility of setting precisely these 
terms for continued relationship with this perpetrator in respect of this crime. Proportionality 
and individualisation of punishment are thus hard-wired into the criminal justice practices of 
states founded on the ideal of equal freedom
47
 – arguably, all modern constitutional states. 
Far from proportionate and discretion-based sentencing being contrasting ideals potentially in 
tension with each other, proportionality in sentencing emerges, as one Irish judge put it, as 
‘the manner in which judicial discretion should, as a matter of principle, be exercised within 
particular proceedings’.48 
                                                          
46
 Ashworth, ‘European Sentencing Traditions’, above n 43. 
47
 For judicial recognition of this point, see the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Canada, which held in R v 
Ipeelee; R v Ladue [2012] 1 SCR 433 (SCC) that ‘proportionality in sentencing could aptly be described as a 
principle of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter’, and has stressed that the duty of the judge is to 
‘impose a sentence that both speaks out against the offence and punishes the offender no more than is necessary’ 
(R v Nasogaluak [2010] 1 SCR 206 (SCC) para 42 (LeBel J)). 
48
 Murray CJ in Whelan and Lynch v Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2007] IESC 34, [2012] 1 
IR 1. 
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This does not however help us much in resolving the question how proportionate 
sanctions should be identified in particular cases. Lacey and Pickard argue that it is a mistake 
to think that ‘appealing to proportionality as an abstract ideal can deliver limits to 
punishment’; rather, such limits ‘need to be grounded in substantive judgments about fair and 
proportionate penalties which are meaningful to, and regarded as legitimate by, the populace 
in whose name they are imposed’.49 They are surely right about this. The notion of 
proportionality as such does not give us much substantive guidance (although it can, and 
does, supply us with the three-step methodology familiar from constitutional adjudication). 
We need to know what values and aims underpin the decision we are about to make.
50
 
Matravers also believes ‘that an entitlement to proportionality in sentencing is not an 
independent principle, but is – as with all entitlements – determined by the wider theory of 
justice’.51 Regarding the latter, Matravers himself has pursued the connections that may exist 
between a Rawlsian notion of distributive justice and retributive justice concerns – 
particularly the question whether we can draw a parallel between natural talents and 
dispositions such as intelligence, discipline, perseverance that Rawlsians understand as 
supplying no ‘desert basis’ in distributive justice, and (in our society) unfortunate individual 
‘constitutions’ (dispositions and personality traits) that tend to bring a person in collision with 
the criminal law.
52
 I want to ask that same question, starting however with a different 
conceptual framework: the wider theory of justice implicit in a constitutional order founded 
on equal concern and respect, and on inalienable rights. 
Of course, one conclusion has long been drawn explicitly in many a constitutional 
document: the prohibition of ‘unusual or degrading’ punishments. But even after we rule out 
sanctions that humiliate offenders and/or inflict suffering for suffering’s sake as violations of 
                                                          
49
 N Lacey and H Pickard, ‘The Chimera of Proportionality: Institutionalising Limits on Punishment in 
Contemporary Social and Political Systems’ (2015) 78 Modern Law Review 216 at 219. 
50
 It is not clear to me that scholars promoting proportionate sentencing would (have reason to) disagree. 
Andreas von Hirsch explicitly recognises that the anchoring points of any penalty scale are fixed through a 
political process that is responsive to cultural notions of severity and to political ideals (of which penal leniency 
may well be one). The overall defensibility of the system is only assured if the anchoring points are set so as not 
to violate the injunction against threatened sanction levels that strike fear rather than appeal to moral agency. 
Ordinal proportionality, which involves parity between crimes of comparable seriousness, rank-ordering of 
types of crimes according to seriousness, and spacing of penal responses so as to reflect these different degrees 
of seriousness, operates within this cardinal setting. (See von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions, above n 20 at 12–
19 and 36–46.) To my mind, then, in von Hirsch’s model proportionality is (quite in line with what Lacey and 
Pickard ibid call for) precisely not ‘a naturally existing relationship, but a product of political and social 
construction, cultural meaning-making, and institution-building’. 
51
 Matravers, ‘Twenty-first Century Punishment’, above n 21 at 42 (original emphases omitted). 
52
 M Matravers, ‘Mad, Bad, or Faulty? Desert in Distributive and Retributive Justice’ in C Knight and Z 
Stemplowska (eds), Responsibility and Distributive Justice (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2011) 136. 
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our constitutional order, we still have to confront the question how heavily the human 
interests and prospects of the person we punish should weigh with us in deciding upon their 
punishment. Do we have a warrant – perhaps even an obligation – to look any further than the 
seriousness of the offending behaviour (its gravity and the offender’s degree of culpability) in 
determining the severity of the response? In some jurisdictions the courts have taken this 
stance. Irish courts have long stressed that ‘[s]entences must be proportionate first of all to 
the crime but also to the personal circumstances of the offender’, because ‘[t]he accused 
person has a constitutional right which guarantees that his trial [does] not shut out a sentence 
appropriate to his degree of guilt and relevant personal circumstances’.53 In Canada, one 
commentator recently concluded that the constitutional jurisprudence on sentencing has 
arrived at a point where  
it would now be an error … for a judge to speak of proportionality without 
emphasizing the individualized nature of the sentencing process and then wrestling 
with the real effects of the criminal process and proposed sentence on the life lived by 
the offender.
54
 
In this section, I want to defend this ‘bifocal’ proportionality assessment, where the 
sentencer must (as part of her task of setting reasonable terms for re-entry) look not just at the 
gravity of the offending behaviour, but also consider the effect of the contemplated 
punishment on the offender considered as a socially embedded human being. Unlike others 
who defend this position, I will not base my argument on giving mercy (or some other 
concept employed to loosen the strictures of a purely deeds-based sentencing approach) its 
due.
55
 My position is a different one: A constitutionally legitimate proportionality 
assessment, I argue, must include considerations pertaining to the person of the offender, 
above and beyond what matters to an assessment of his culpability in respect of the crime. 
This argument relies on two interconnected constitutional values – humanity and welfare. 
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 See, e g The State (Healy) v Donoghue [1976] IR 325 (Henchy J); The People (Attorney General) v 
O’Driscoll (1972) 1 Frewen 351 (Walsh J), The People (DPP) v M [1994] 3 IR 306 (Denham J); Director of 
Public Prosecutions v Stephen Kelly, judgment of 5 July 2004 (CA) (unreported) (Hardiman J); Pudliszewski v 
Judge Coughlan [2006] IEHC 304 (MacMenamin J).  
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 B L Berger, ‘Sentencing and the Salience of Pain and Hope’ (2015) 70 Supreme Court Law Review 337 at 
361. For a review of developments in the case law, see also M-E Sylvestre, ‘The (Re)Discovery of the 
Proportionality Principle in Sentencing in Ipeelee: Constitutionalization and the Emergence of Collective 
Responsibility’ (2013) 63 Supreme Court Law Review 461.  
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 See, e g, J Tasioulas, ‘Punishment and Repentance’ (2006) 81 Philosophy 279; B van Stokkom, ‘Tempering 
Justice with Compassion: Rationales of Personal Mitigation in Sentencing’ in D J Cornwell, J Blad and M 
Wright (eds), Civilising Criminal Justice: An International Restorative Agenda for Penal Reform (Sherfield-on-
Loddon, Waterside Press, 2013) 255. 
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B. Humanity and welfare in sentencing 
If punishment responds to what this person has done, that also means that it responds to this 
person who has done it. Refusing to see this person as a full, three-dimensional, human being 
with a biography and a future would be to disregard and thereby disrespect his humanity. 
Such a shutting out of questions concerning who it is we punish – treating him as entirely 
defined (for our purposes) by the crime he has committed and the mindset with which he 
committed it – would be a kind of disrespect. By considering how a sentence will affect a 
convicted person’s life more generally, a sentencer shows that she is prepared to treat the 
offender as a potential source of value – not just of ‘intrinsic value’ as a human being, but as 
importantly connected to others – of value as a socially embedded agent who cares about, and 
is cared about, by other people, for reasons pertaining to him and how he leads his life if one 
casts one’s eye wider than the crime. In other words, she does not reduce the person to the 
crime. Ideally, perceiving the offender concretely as a socially embedded individual whose 
existence brings value to some other people’s lives, will push the sentencer towards a better 
understanding of how the sanction she has in mind to impose will affect that person, and she 
will make an effort to avoid gratuitous infliction of harm.
56
 Sentencing is also a human 
interaction. Once the ‘you’ is seen more clearly for who he is, the question ‘what should I do 
to you’ becomes more arduous. Proportionality as  
an intrinsically individualized concept … denies escape to the comfort of cool metrics 
and abstract guidelines for the judge faced with the harrowing moment of intervening 
in the shape of an individual’s life through the infliction of suffering. Ethically, that is 
as it should be, because this demand for sympathetic engagement with the particular 
person standing before the court invites modesty and caution about the use and effects 
of state violence as a response to social breakdown.
57
  
As the sentencer understands better what is at stake for the person being sentenced, moral 
responsibility for the sentence can no longer be hived off to the impersonal command of the 
law that authorises the decision.
58
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 On the risk that such human emotions may also backfire against particular offenders, and the consequent need 
to have sentencers who are self-aware and calm enough to control against their own visceral reactions of disgust 
and contempt, see J Q Whitman, ‘Making Happy Punishers’ (2004-2005) 118 Harvard Law Review 2698 at 
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 Berger, ‘Sentencing’, above n 54 at 361.  
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For some, such individualisation of sentencing decisions is itself a cause for worry. 
What is at the heart of this worry has perhaps been captured best in Thorburn’s defence of a 
‘strong proportionality principle’ – the term coined by Michael Tonry59 for the proportionate 
sentencing model developed and defended by Andreas von Hirsch and Andrew Ashworth
60
 – 
over a ‘limiting retributivism’ that allows sentencers to take different sentencing goals into 
account in shaping the outcome of their decision. Thorburn asserts that desert-based 
sentencing ‘ties the structure of judicial reasoning in the process of determining sentences to 
the grounds of the state’s role in imposing criminal punishment’61 in that it keeps the 
sentencing judge within the bounds of considerations it is constitutionally appropriate for a 
sentencing judge to engage in: it ensures that the judge will ‘provide the right sort of 
justification for the sentence she imposes in the particular case’.62 
Thorburn’s objection to inviting judges to consider the life history and personal 
characteristics of the offender, and to adjust a sentence in light of how the judge expects the 
sanction to affect the future life course of the offender, rests on a divergence between state 
punishment and parental punishment when it comes to ‘the normative ground of the authority 
the punisher holds over the punishee’.63 Whereas ‘parents are legitimately charged with 
ensuring the welfare of their children, broadly understood’, the remit of the state’s authority 
over the individual citizen qua offender is both ‘different in kind and much narrower in 
scope’.64 By implication this appears to exclude a welfare orientation from state punishment, 
given that welfare-oriented decision-making presupposes a legitimately paternalistic stance 
which, in turn, only exists when the grounds of authority are essentially fiduciary in nature.  
There is considerable truth in that contrast. Yet it becomes in my view overdrawn 
when it appears to rule out a welfare-oriented dimension to state-imposed punishment. 
Thorburn is sensitive to this, hinting that it might be possible to justify ‘deviat[ions] from the 
proportionate sentence on grounds of rehabilitation … [as] part of a larger argument 
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concerning the necessary conditions for ensuring the independence of the offender’.65 My 
main argument here is that we should not think of rehabilitative considerations as leading to 
‘deviations’ from a punishment that would otherwise be warranted at all – instead, we should 
recognise that considerations concerning the offender’s humanity and personal interests are 
integral to the notion of proportionate punishment in the constitutional state. 
Our fundamental constitutional values commit us to treating each other as creatures of 
intrinsic value. This gives rise to a concern for the welfare of every member of the polity. At 
the most general level, this commits us to shaping our institutions of public life such that they 
will not be harmful or disadvantageous to individual members of the polity but will rather 
help them in leading productive and fulfilling lives.  
Insofar as we act with a welfare orientation, we treat fellow members of the polity as 
entitled to a certain degree of support simply because they are fellow citizens, and not 
because of any factors about them as individuals that make them particularly deserving of 
support. Thus, we do not make access to healthcare conditional upon a person having done 
nothing to put their own health at risk: we treat mountain climbers, smokers, drinkers, drug 
addicts, and the sexually adventurous, just like everyone else. This is not, I take it, because 
we wouldn’t be prepared to judge such behaviours morally (and, in the context of such moral 
judgment, disapprove of some behaviours on the basis that the person not only lets herself 
down, but indirectly us as well, given that we promised to provide each other with a certain 
level of basic services without enquiring whether a person’s need to access these services was 
avoidable or not, and that they knew this as well as we do). Of course, part of the reason why 
we refrain from allowing such moral judgments to register in our public settings of access to 
services is the practical concern that it would be very difficult to make such judgments 
reliably. But the larger part of the reason pertains to our political morality – we think that the 
kind of society in which access to basic social support depends on judgments of individual 
moral deservingness is one that imports too much personal moral judgment into the public 
domain, which is ultimately not conducive to our common good. 
This is not a commitment that evaporates when a member of the polity commits a 
crime. The welfare orientation of all state action must also register in how we design our 
criminal justice system. The offender remains a member of this polity, and a concern with his 
legitimate interests – including the interest to one day to return to a common life in freedom – 
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is integral to what may be done to him by way of state-imposed punishment.
66
 In short, 
constitutionally appropriate sentencing considerations must seek to assess not just culpability-
related matters but also the reality of this offender being made subject to this punishment. 
If I am right, we are now in a position to see why Thorburn is wrong to assert that 
strong proportionality is the only position compatible with the grounds of state authority. The 
state’s authority partly rests on its commitment to welfare – this does not give it an 
entitlement to ‘forge ahead making people better in their own interest’ but it does need to be 
factored into how we run our penal system – and if we do so, responsiveness of the system to 
the person of the offender becomes a necessity. 
C. Towards a thick conception of constitutional proportionality in 
sentencing 
The view I defend reflects sentencing principles that are widely accepted and practised 
elsewhere as well.
67
 What makes the Irish courts’ position noteworthy is that what I have 
described as a ‘bifocal’ approach to proportionate sentencing is drawn directly from the 
constitution, and while the judgments do not spell out from which specific provisions in the 
Irish constitution this interpretation is drawn, it is at least plausible that some notion of the 
state’s concern for the humanity and welfare of each member of the polity underlies it.68  
The Irish courts’ approach leads to a thicker notion of ‘constitutional 
disproportionality’ than the traditional approaches to constitutionally disproportionate 
punishment, where it is the extreme disconnection between the overall severity of the penal 
response and the gravity of the underlying crime that drives the investigation.
69
 It also pushes 
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sentencing outcomes towards moderation. By accepting that the punishment, quite 
independently of the severity of the offending behaviour to which it is a response, also has to 
be proportionate to ‘the personal circumstances of the offender’, it links proportionality with 
respect for the humanity of the offender. It recognises the value of the offender’s life in a 
substantive rather than a merely formal sense. But perhaps the most important implication of 
the injunction to consider whether the sentence is appropriate not only to the offender’s 
‘degree of guilt’ but also to his ‘relevant personal circumstances’70 is that we have to consider 
the effects of the imposition of punishment on the offender as a human individual as 
something that we have to take responsibility for when punishing him, and not simply as 
something that we can, indeed should, shrug off with a ‘he brought it all upon himself’. 
Earlier in this chapter I mentioned Matravers’ exploration of a Rawlsian approach to 
retributive justice. Matravers observes that: 
The tendency to act aggressively, and the tendency to work hard, are not only 
‘influenced by … natural abilities and skills’, but are also both related to certain kinds 
of outcomes only because of arbitrary circumstances that converted one into an 
advantage and the other into a handicap.
71
 
Extending the benefit of a constitutional welfare commitment also to offenders is one way of 
making concrete ‘Rawls’ vision of justice as an agreement “to share each other’s fates”’ – 
Matravers emphasising that ‘the reasons we have to endorse prejusticial egalitarianism apply 
equally to the retributive case’.72 This is not, Matravers stresses, because individual offenders 
are not responsible for their actions. They are. Holding people to account for their violations 
of our order of equal freedom is quite compatible with recognising that living one’s life 
successfully on the terms set by that order is harder for some than for others, and that this in 
itself gives us reason to consider only a welfare-oriented criminal law distributively just. 
The practical import of the stance I take varies with the overall level of sanction 
severity prevalent in a given penal system. The humanistic proportionality approach endorsed 
by the Irish courts makes a real difference when compared to deed-proportionate approaches 
in sentencing systems which resort with greater frequency to sanctions with inherently 
destructive effects on the lives of those who undergo them for significant periods of time. The 
significance of the contrast I have drawn here between a sentencing decision that is 
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responsive in its own right to what a particular sanction will do to an offender as a person, to 
his selfhood and life prospects more generally, and a sentencing decision that restricts its 
attention (except in exceptional cases) to an effort to respond to the gravity of the offending 
behaviour under sentence, will fade as sanctions themselves become less fearsome and 
destructive. In penal systems where curfews, weekend imprisonment, electronic monitoring, 
open prisons and the like are standard ways of serving even fairly long prison sentences, the 
offender still has ways of engaging in ‘almost normal’ personal and work relationships. These 
types of restrictions on the offender’s free movement are, unlike traditional confinement in 
prison, pared down to their pure freedom-restricting effects. They do not restrict life-chances 
to a degree comparable with traditional incarceration. In such a sanctioning system judges 
will have less cause to be troubled by the effects that a sanction will have on the person of the 
offender – as these effects are unlikely to be destructive of the life prospects of released 
offenders. Against the backdrop of sanctions that are in themselves already moderated 
compared to present levels of penal severity, apportioning punishment on along the lines 
advocated by von Hirsch and Ashworth will lead to much the same result as an explicit 
instruction to judges to consider how the punishment imposed will affect the punishee as a 
human being. But we should not forget how far many penal systems are from such a 
situation.
73
 
It ought to be clear now that the re-integrative conception of the criminal court’s 
judgment does not demand that judges be given an almost unfettered sentencing discretion. 
Setting appropriate terms for a polity’s continued relations with the perpetrator, as a practical 
task and a normative ideal, does not require the absence of any restrictions on the court’s 
ability to carve out a response. The perspective on the trial court’s sentencing judgment 
developed here is intended to give shape and unity to the court’s task by identifying the 
overarching framework of assumptions and purposes in which this task is necessarily 
performed. The model I defend differs from both of the two main scholarly positions on the 
exercise of sentencing discretion, limiting retributivism and desert-based sentencing. Against 
limiting retributivism, it maintains that the sentencing stage of criminal justice must be 
oriented towards one particular goal pursued by criminal justice systems over others: the goal 
of re-integration. It is not open to sentencing judges to pursue what are in effect policies of 
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deterrence of certain kinds of conduct (of which the defendant’s crime is taken to be a typical 
instance) by imposing a heavier sentence on a defendant than they otherwise would. Against 
desert-based sentencing, it argues that the sentencing decision legitimately should – indeed, 
must – consider the person of the offender and his situatedness in the social world (his 
subjectivity) quite apart from his mental state and other criteria going to his blameworthiness 
when he was committing his crime. Such attention to the offender’s social self is not 
incompatible with proportionate sentencing practices. To the contrary: this is how, in a 
sentencing system oriented towards re-integration for the very same constitutional reason that 
animates proportionality, the constitutional promise to treat each other with respect for our 
humanity and welfare can be fulfilled. 
There is, of course, a possible wide divide between the normative ideal of being a 
criminal defendant (and later convicted offender) whose entitlement to equal concern and 
respect as a fellow member of the polity is acknowledged throughout, and the lived reality of 
being a criminal defendant and later a convicted offender. The real terms of interaction may 
well be status-reducing, dignity-sapping and expressive of a perception that the punished 
individual is less than equal and not entitled to full citizenship rights. This can be true both 
for the legal regimes that govern individuals with some types of criminal records (collateral 
consequences of conviction, post-release reporting duties and reduced privacy protections are 
cases in point
74
) and of informal social consequences of, particularly, prolonged periods of 
imprisonment – the de-socialising effects of prison being well known and researched.75  
Two further points should be made in this regard, though. Firstly, the normative ideal 
of equal membership in the polity can (and already does) inform critiques and reform efforts 
directed at current penal realities, whether these strive to replace imprisonment with 
alternative sanctions or to reform imprisonment such that it avoids alienation and de-
socialisation.
76
 Secondly, we must distinguish between commitments we make in our 
political constitutions about how we will relate to each other through the powerful institutions 
of collective self-governance, on the one hand, and how we interact with each other in our 
private social encounters, on the other hand. Notwithstanding that the line between public and 
private matters is difficult to draw (employment discrimination against ex-convicts being a 
case in point), there is a difference between upholding the normative political ideal of equal 
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freedom and the moral ideal of treating everyone with equal concern and respect in our 
interactions as private individuals. It is not illegitimate in our private lives to seek to 
distinguish between persons by their differing moral worth, nor is it the point of our political 
constitution to disallow people from doing that. In this sense, the promise of treating each 
other with equal concern and respect will always be partial.
77
 It binds us only in the part of 
our lives that is structured through our public political institutions. It is a personal choice for 
each one how far we commit ourselves to living according to that ideal also in our private 
lives. 
A generally non-re-integrative, exclusion-based vision of criminal justice is, however, 
not one by which our criminal justice system can claim to implement the basic commitments 
on which our political constitution is founded. Assuming that the ideology which informs the 
penal practices of modern constitutional states rests on the inclusionary, rights-respecting 
vision of political membership and limited power that I have developed in this chapter, 
questions can and must be asked about the legitimacy of ‘life-thrashing sanctions’ of which 
very long terms of imprisonment and whole-life sentences imposed to meet punitive 
objectives alone are pertinent examples. If our entitlement to punish each other for criminal 
wrongs through our collectively created penal institutions is, as I have argued, grounded in a 
non-negotiable commitment to equal concern and respect premised on equally non-negotiable 
membership, and if – as I have also argued – we are for this reason committed to a re-
integrative conception of state punishment, then some punishments are so obviously 
destructive that, qua punishments, they are beyond this account of legitimation. 
 
IV. Conclusion 
A penal system needs what Loader has called ‘a coherent public philosophy—a story about 
why and whom, and how and how much, “we” punish that connects with, and re-articulates, 
sentiments that have some purchase within … society’.78 When examining the legitimacy of 
trial justice, Henham similarly claims that we need to focus ‘on the extent to which 
sentencing outcomes reflect a “shared morality” about the appropriateness of punishment and 
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its impact’.79 What I suggest here is that this ‘shared morality’ is not a shared conception of 
punishment but a shared vision of legitimate public authority – a constitutionally grounded 
vision of how we must treat and what we may and may not do to each other.  
This vision of political morality might well be a contested one. Hutton observes that 
one reason why sentencers are increasingly exposed to negative press reaction and to political 
intervention in sentencing through mandatory sentencing laws appears to be a weakening of 
the ‘social justice paradigm’ that underpinned, among other things, trust in judges as 
representatives of a societal interest common to all – what Garland (whom Hutton cites) has 
called ‘the ideas and values of the solidarity project which emerged in the postwar years’.80 
One consequence may be that ‘the public may no longer be convinced by the discourse of 
justice used by courts’, giving rise to a ‘need for a “replacement discourse” for sentencing’.81 
This connects to Lacey and Pickard’s hypothesis that ‘contemporary societies which have 
managed to sustain stable limits to punishment have done so … through institutions and 
attitudes that foster reconciliatory dispositions between citizens’, and to their further claim 
that ‘cultural and institutional arrangements which foster high “Associational Value” – in 
other words, greater expected benefits of continued cooperation between individuals and 
groups – also foster reconciliatory dispositions’.82 For Lacey and Pickard, societies that invest 
heavily in the education and skills development of their members will be more reluctant than 
others to render such members unproductive – hence their preference for shorter sentences 
and for non-incapacitating sanctions.
83
 
The replacement discourse that is suggested by the conception of the sentencing 
decision that I put forward in this chapter reminds the public of the offender’s common 
membership in this political community; of the reasons why such membership ought not to be 
forfeitable, and why exclusion from the shared social world is not a coherent objective of 
punishment. It is true, of course, that even this commitment may crumble, that societies stop 
believing in extending recognition and rights to all. But loudmouthed calls for extreme 
punishments are often made in the abstract, with the recipient of such punishment being 
conveniently imagined as less than human. When ‘criminals are viewed as recognizable 
members of the community … and the criminal acts portrayed are more mundane, the kinds 
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of things respondents might imagine themselves doing in certain circumstances, an 
alternative discourse about the nature of crime and punishment becomes possible’.84 
My sense is that penal moderation may not so much emerge as a quasi-automatic 
upshot from empirical conditions of high associational value as that it requires associational 
commitment, a political commitment towards continued association – which, in turn, can be 
read as a commitment to a (possibly counterfactual) assumption of high associational value. 
That said, it may be true that for this political commitment to be upheld, Lacey and Pickard 
are right to suggest that ‘the key to penal moderation lies not only in reintegrative criminal 
justice policy, but in social policy and in political arrangements and institutional structures 
which maximise expected Associational Value among citizens’.85 
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